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We explore why some firms in the extractive industries disclose mineral reserve 
quantum in their annual reports and others do not. We propose that the firms’ 
reserve disclosure policies are a function of the extent of information asymmetries, 
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specifically, we propose that a firm’s decisions to disclose reserves in the annual 
report are a function of the stage of the firm's operations, use of project financing, 
and the cost of measuring reserves. Empirical tests are confirmatory.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A now substantial literature on voluntary corporate disclosures attempts to identify 
the costs and benefits of various disclosures to predict the circumstances in which 
they will occur (Verrecchia, 1983; Healy, Palepu and Sweeney, 1995; Aboody, 
1996; Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan, 1999).  This is likely to be useful to both 
regulators considering whether to make particular disclosures mandatory, and 
financial analysts trying to interpret managerial disclosure (together with other 
information) to determine firm value.  In most, if not all cases, the researchers 
assume that managers are considering disclosing information that they have 
available internally, or in other words the marginal cost of  information production 
is low.  To illustrate, disclosures of earnings forecasts and contract signings imply 
low information costs if such information is available to managers internally.   
 
Low marginal information production costs need not always be the case, especially 
in the extractive industries where the assessment of quantities is costly.  In this 
paper we consider voluntary disclosure of reserve quantum by firms in the 
Australian extractive industries. Such firms control reserves of either minerals or 
oil and gas, but the extent and quality of their reserves is uncertain.  It is 
logistically feasible for the uncertainty to be reduced, but at the substantial cost of 
extra drilling and related assessments.  Therefore, when considering disclosure of 
the quantum of reserves, managers in this industry face unusually high costs of 
information production.  In this paper, we show that the decision to disclose 
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reserve quantum is partially determined by the certainty of the quantum estimate, 
which in turn is determined by the marginal costs of reducing the uncertainty of the 
estimates to an optimum level in terms of the firm’s cost of capital and trade-offs 
with other costs such as those associated with managerial reputation. 
 
It is stressed that the dependent variable of interest to us is the quantum of 
reserves.  While we do not directly try to explain the relatively few instances of 
disclosure of reserve values (Mirza and Zimmer, 1999) we note that the term 
“reserve” does itself imply that the mineral deposit can be profitably extracted 
(Miskelly, 1994) and therefore does provide some information about reserve 
values.  This distinguishes a reserve from a resource, which is a mineral deposit 
that may or may not be profitably extracted. 
 
While a number of previous studies conclude that mandatory oil and gas reserve 
disclosures affect share prices (Bell, 1983; Clinch and Magliolo, 1990; Teall, 
1992; Spear, 1994), the only previous study that we could identify that tries to 
provide reasons for the exercise of discretion by managers to disclose reserve 
information is Craswell and Taylor (1992).  Craswell and Taylor propose that the 
firm's decision to disclose oil and gas reserves is for the purpose of reducing 
contracting costs. They investigate five variables that are likely to influence 
managers’ choice to disclose reserve quantity estimates.  The variables tested are 
leverage, cash flow risk, separation of ownership and control, firm size and auditor 
identity.  Their results are mixed.  We extend this previous work by proposing that 
the degree of certainty, or incremental information production costs, is an 
important determinant of the disclosure decision.  
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The context of the paper is that managers of listed corporations face a trade-off 
between information asymmetry costs on the one hand and proprietary and 
litigation costs of disclosure on the other. For mining companies, information 
asymmetries exist regarding mineral reserves that the firm has the option to 
extract.   While in many circumstances a policy of regular disclosure is likely to 
reduce the firm’s cost of capital (Verrechia, 1983), this will not be value increasing 
if proprietary and/or litigation costs are high.  Proprietary costs include the 
competitive actions of competitors. Given rational competitors, disclosure of 
proprietary information is likely to be value reducing for the firm. 
 
Litigation costs refer to the possibility of managers and/or directors being sued or 
prosecuted for allegedly misleading the market by causing the firm to be 
overvalued. Managers aim to achieve an optimum level of disclosure in the firm’s 
annual report by trading-off information asymmetry costs against litigation and 
proprietary costs.  Skinner (1994) shows that in the US the relation between 
disclosure and litigation costs is not symmetric, in that costs of non-disclosure of 
bad news are likely to be greater than costs of non-disclosure of good news.  The 
reason is that where managers perceive the market to be over-valuing their firm, 
they have incentives to quickly disclose any relevant bad news so as to not be 
attacked for allegedly misleading the market once the bad news becomes known to 
the market.  In principle, Skinner’s results “should not” hold in Australia, where 
literal interpretations of continuous disclosure requirements imply no managerial 
discretion over disclosures.  Indeed, a strict reading of the Australian regulations 
would conclude that “voluntary disclosures” do not exist. However, consistent 
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with results of Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) we assume that the effect of the 
continuous disclosure rules has been at best marginal, and in any case does not 
eradicate incentives for managers to exercise some discretion over disclosures.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the regulatory requirements in 
the USA and Australia. Section 3 develops hypotheses for disclosure of reserve 
quantum in the firms’ annual reports. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to research 
design and analysis of results. Section 6 presents a summary of the paper. 
 
 
2. Regulatory background 
 
The only mandatory requirement for disclosure of quantities of reserves existing 
anywhere in the world is the US Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No.69, Disclosures About Oil and Gas Producing Activities (November 1982). 
Even this only applies to proved oil and gas reserves. In Australia, the Australian 
Accounting Standards  AAS  7 and AASB 1022, Accounting for the Extractive 
Industries, recommend amortising capitalised pre-production costs on the basis of 
depletion of "economically recoverable reserves". The standards do not require 
disclosure of such reserves. In July 1989, the Australian Stock Exchange 
incorporated the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy Code for 
reporting of ore reserves in its listing rules (4) to (12) of Section 3M. Over time, 
the requirements have been extended to oil and gas firms’ reserves (rule 3M (8)). 
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However, apart from the possible influence of continuous disclosure rules 
discussed earlier, the ASX does not require disclosure of the quantum of mineral 
reserves. Its listing rules state that where a firm reports reserve quantity, it should 
use a format specified by the AusIMM Code. The Corporations Law also does not 
require disclosure. In other words, disclosure of reserves in the firm’s annual 
report is at the discretion of management. Such discretion is likely to be influenced 
by the benefits to the firm of reducing information asymmetries regarding reserves 
quantum, and the magnitude of proprietary as well as litigation costs of disclosure. 
 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 
The basic premise of this study is that managers’ reserve disclosure polices are 
driven by a need to minimise information asymmetries about the extent of proved 
reserves controlled by the firm, proprietary costs and costs of potential litigation. 
The purpose of this section is to consider circumstances where this trade-off is 
most likely to result in disclosures occurring.  We propose that managers are more 
likely to provide reserve disclosures where they are more certain of the accuracy of 
their reserve estimates.  Distinct (at least in degree) from some other discretionary 
disclosures such as earnings forecasts, accuracy of reserve estimates is a matter of 
cost. Very precise estimates could always be obtained if drilling and related 
assessment procedures were not costly.  Our argument essentially identifies some 
circumstances where the marginal information production costs are low.  We 
conclude the section by hypothesising that this occurs where the firm is a producer 
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rather than developer, where project financing is in place, and where the type of 
commodity is such that the cost of measurement is low. 
 
Firms in the extractive industries are likely to disclose reserves in annual reports to 
signal to claimants the value of the firms’ assets. Francis, Philbrick and Schipper 
(1992) propose that a fundamental economic force for full disclosure is the wish of 
managers to distinguish themselves and their firms from others with less desirable 
attributes (p. 7). The disclosure of reserve quantum signals to debt and equity 
holders that the reserves exist and that their extraction and subsequent sales is 
relatively certain.  Without disclosure of reserve quantities, the parties that are 
external to the firm are likely to find it costly to estimate the reserves’ value. 
 
 
3.1. Proprietary costs and information  asymmetry 
 
Why then do not all the firms disclose their reserves’ quantity in their annual 
reports? Of course, under certain conditions managers may prefer that the market 
over-estimates firm value.  Given positive costs of litigation and managerial 
reputation, supported by evidence of managers speedily disclosing bad news, this 
is unlikely to be a powerful factor in a non-disclose choice.  Indeed, litigation and 
proprietary costs associated with public disclosure about assets of the firm such as 
reserves are likely to more generally cause non-disclosure1.  There are two types of 
                     
1 We could not however identify any cases of litigation regarding public disclosures of reserves.  
Litigation regarding disclosure occurred between CRA and Diversified Mineral Resources 
(Matthew Stevens, “CRA’s legal victory also a win for small miners,” The Australian, 10 February, 
1995, p. 31) and between Savage Resources and WMC (Bryan Frith, “Showdown for Ernest 
Henry,” The Business Australian, 2 April, 1993, p. 26). 
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proprietary costs involved in the disclosure of mineral reserves.  The first is the 
proprietary cost of disclosing the existence of reserves. On discovery, the 
information about the reserves is required to be disclosed to the ASX and other 
relevant government agencies. In other words, the proprietary value associated 
with the discovery of reserves is likely to be dissipated as soon as the discovery is 
announced.  The second proprietary cost is the cost associated with the extraction 
of minerals from the ground. This cost relates to the firm’s management strategy, 
the cost of production, the uniqueness of the production process and the costs, as 
well as the prices to be obtained on sale of product. Information about these 
features of reserves is valuable to the competitors and is only likely to gradually 
become public as the firm extracts the reserves.  
 
 
3.2. The nature of reserves and estimation procedures 
 
The preceding discussion shows that managers have incentives for and constraints 
on providing disclosure voluntarily in their firms' annual reports.  The question 
addressed is what motivates managers to voluntarily disclose the quantity of 
reserves, such as grams of gold or barrels of oil? This section outlines disclosure of 
reserves’ quantum in the firm’s published annual report. This is then followed by a 
discussion of the reasons for such disclosure. 
 
Mineral reserve quantity estimates are normally prepared by the geologists, who 
may be either employed by the firm or by outside consultants. In addition, the 
firm’s management and/or its geologists determine the estimated timing of the 
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future production of the proved reserve quantities (Alciatore, 1990, p. 6). Mineral 
deposits are usually described as either "resources" or "reserves". A mineral 
resource is defined as an identified in situ mineral occurrence from which valuable  
minerals may be recovered (Miskelly, 1994, p. 20).  A reserve is that part of a 
resource which is intended to be mined. It describes a more advanced stage of 
development of a mineral deposit than a "resource". A resource is simply a 
precursor of a reserve.2  Ore reserves are usually classified into "probable" and 
"proved" categories.3 The following diagram shows the relationships between 
resources and reserves and probable and proved ore reserves.  
                     
 
2 An interesting dichotomy between reserves and resources is provided by Pierpont: 
 
Very roughly, mine reserves are orebodies that have been well enough measured for 
Pierpont to know he can dig them up and sell the mineral content at a profit.  
Resources, by contrast, are minerals that have been discovered in the ground but 
which nobody has defined well enough yet to know whether they’re economic or 
not.   
 
Pierpont, “Guess what fell off a truck this week?" The Australian Financial Review, July 24, 1998, 
p. 76. 
 
3 Miskelly (1994) states: 
 
The term "Probable Ore Reserve" means an Ore Reserve stated in terms of mineable 
tonnes/volume and grades where the corresponding Identified Mineral Resource has 
been defined by drilling, sampling or excavation  (including extensions beyond 
actual openings and drill-holes) and where the geological factors that control the ore 
body are known with sufficient confidence that the Mineral Resource is categorised 
as "Indicated". 
 
The term "Proved Ore Reserves" means an Ore Reserve stated in terms of   
tonnes/volume and grade in which the corresponding Identified Mineral Resource 
has been defined in three dimensions by excavation or drilling (including minor 
extensions beyond actual openings and drill holes), and where the geological factors 
that limit the ore body are known with sufficient confidence that the Mineral 
Resource is categorised as "Measured" (p. 24). 
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Relationship between Identified Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves
IDENTIFIED
MINERAL 
RESOURCES
ORE RESERVES
(In situ) (Mineable)
INFERRED
INDICATED PROBABLE
PROVEDMEASURED
Consideration of economic,
mining, metallurgical,
marketing, legal, environ-
mental, social and govern-
mental factors.
Increasing
level of
geological
data,
knowledge
and
confidence
Source: AusIMM Code 1992  
 
Fig. 1. Classification of mineral resources and reserves 
 
A variety of terms were in use for reserves prior to the adoption of the AusIMM 
Code by the ASX in 1989. The Exposure Draft that preceded AAS 7 identified 
three categories of reserves (Henderson and Peirson, 2000). Proved reserves were 
those reserves for which volume and grades could be computed within close limits. 
Probable reserves included reserves for which volumes and grades could be 
estimated with reasonable assurance on the basis of geological evidence. Possible 
deposits/fields meant mineral deposits or oil and natural gas fields for which 
volume could be only tentatively assessed on the basis of broad geological 
assumptions (p. 697).  
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However, AASB 1022 treats the proved and probable reserves as one, and uses the 
term “economically recoverable reserves”.4 We also collapse proved and/or 
probable categories into one measure, and use the term “reserves”. Disclosure of 
resources is excluded because resources are "too indefinite" (Lindley, Shorr, 
Crerie, and Stewart, 1976, p. 427). The major determinants likely to influence 
voluntary disclosure of reserves are: (a) the uncertainty surrounding the 
recoverability of reserves, (b) the source of debt financing,  and (c) measurement  
costs of reserves.  
 
 
3.3.  Uncertainty surrounding reserves’ quantum 
 
Projects in the extractive industries typically have a high degree of uncertainty and 
risk. Large sums are spent at the exploration and evaluation stages and there is 
doubt about finding economic mineral reserves. Once a reserve is identified, the 
technical feasibility of extraction has to be carried out and shafts sunk, mountains 
moved, off-shore platforms built and so forth. All this expenditure is incurred 
before any saleable product is obtained (Luther,  p. 4).  There is normally a 
substantial time lag between exploration, development, construction, and 
production stages during the life of a mine or other project. Uncertainty results 
from insufficient drilling and evaluation that does not lead to an estimate of reserve 
quantum nor even to a conclusion that a reserve exists. Uncertainty is more likely 
                     
4 The term “economically recoverable reserves” is used in the Standard in relation to the 
amortisation of exploration and evaluation costs and not reporting or recognition of reserves as 
such. 
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to constrain than lead to disclosure of reserves in the firm’s annual report. The 
reason is that where estimates are subsequently found to be substantially incorrect, 
managers and auditors suffer reputation losses, and the risk of litigation is high. 
 
The constraint of uncertainty on disclosure is reflected in continuous disclosure 
rules.  While listing rule 3A requires immediate disclosure of price sensitive 
information, rule states this does not apply where: 
 
(i) a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed: and 
(ii) the information is confidential; and  
(iii) one or more of the following conditions apply: 
(a) it would be a breach of the law to disclose the information; 
(b) the information is, or is part of, an incomplete proposal or negotiation; 
(c) the information comprises matters of supposition or is insufficiently 
definite to warrant disclosure 
(d) the information is generated for the internal management purposes of 
the company; or 
(e) the information is a trade secret. 
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3.4.  Stage of the firm’s operations 
 
In the extractive industries, there is likely to be an association between the level of 
uncertainty surrounding the existence of reserves and a firm's stage of operations. 
As the firm finds and develops reserves and extracts minerals, uncertainty 
surrounding operations decreases.  That is, a firm at the exploration stage has 
greater uncertainty about the existence of reserves than the one that is producing 
minerals and is earning revenue.  
 
At the exploration stage, the degree of uncertainty surrounding the lease or a 
project is likely to be high. Until a resource is converted into a proven reserve, its 
chances of becoming a producing mine are low. Although at the development 
stage, reserves are proven, the final product is still in the ground and the 
uncertainty about its quantum and value persists. Figure 2 demonstrates a likely 
association between the stage of operations of the firm and the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding its reserves:  
 
 
 
 Stage of the firm’s operations 
 Uncertainty 
 surrounding reserves' 
 estimates 
Exploration and evaluation   High 
Proving of mineral reserves and development  Low 
Construction and production              Very  Low 
Fig. 2. Stage of the firm’s operations and uncertainty 
surrounding reserves' estimates 
 
Apart from uncertainty, the proprietary costs of disclosing reserves of a project that 
is at the development stage are likely to be higher than those of one at the 
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production stage. The reason is that at the development stage, a reserve’s estimate 
has the added noise in geological features, and expected production and sales 
estimates. As the firm moves from development stage to production, the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the reserve decreases. Therefore, a stronger incentive 
exists at the production rather than the development stage for managers to disclose 
reserve quantum.  
 
H1: Producer firms are more likely than developer firms to disclose 
their reserves in annual reports. 
 
Note that this is not a weak test of the uncertainty factor influencing disclosures.  
At the development  stage of the project the extent of uncertainty implies strong 
incentives to use disclosures, to reduce the cost of capital.  The argument leading to 
the hypothesis implies that the uncertainty related costs outlined exceed the 
incentives to disclose for the purpose of attracting investors. 
 
 
3.5.  The use of project-specific financing 
 
Substantial capital is needed to develop discovered reserves. To acquire funds, the 
firm is able to offer its assets as a security. These assets can be considered to be of 
two types: assets in place and growth opportunities (Myers, 1977). (More 
correctly, the attributes of assets being “in-place vs growth opportunities” are 
continuous, with all assets having some degree of both).  Firms are likely to 
finance their mineral development and production programs by borrowing on 
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specific projects. "Project finance" is a financing of a particular economic unit in 
which a lender is satisfied to look initially to the cash flows and earnings of the 
economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be repaid and to the 
assets of the economic unit as collateral for the loan (Nevitt, 1983, p. 3). Previous 
papers have documented relations between the existence of project finance and 
accounting techniques and disclosures (e.g., Zimmer 1986; Godfrey 1994; and 
Walker 1999).  
 
Within the extractive industries, firms use project-specific loans for a variety of 
activities such as development of iron ore deposits or coal reserves and 
construction of associated plants. In the case of gold mining firms, an additional 
type of project specific financing arrangement is the use of gold loans and gold 
funding facilities. A gold loan is a form of project finance where a physical 
commodity is borrowed, instead of currency (Jacks, 1990). Lenders tailor gold 
loans to suit the borrowers' production plans; thus enabling borrowers to return the 
agreed quantity of gold bullion in an orderly fashion (Heaney, Wai and Walker, 
1997, p. 129).  
 
Project financing has a number of attributes conducive to minimizing the cost of 
debt capital. First, the lender's recourse is limited to the assets and cash flow of the 
project for which the loan has been borrowed; however the lender’s priority in 
terms of the project assets is relatively clear; implying minimal problems of claim 
dilution and asset substitution. Repayments and the loan maturities are tailored to 
suit the cash flows of the project. Second, an external party such as an auditor or 
an independent consultant evaluates the project before finance is approved. The 
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“due diligence process” enhances the borrower's confidence in the viability of the 
project. Finally, because a specific, well-defined project supports the loan, the 
covenants of the debt contract are likely to be less restrictive than those of general 
debt.  Lenders focus on the cash flows of the nominated project only. Therefore, 
under certain conditions project finance is likely to result in lower agency costs of 
debt relative to the agency costs of general borrowing.   
  
 Despite the benefits, a borrower faces several disadvantages in using project 
specific finance, not the least of which is the loss of confidentiality. The process of 
obtaining finance normally involves evaluation of the project by the lender’s 
technical advisers, independent consultants and lawyers, thus reducing the level of 
confidentiality. Other drawbacks of project financing include the complexity of the 
contracts,5 and additional legal and financing costs.   
       
                     
5 Consider the following conditions of Lihir Gold Ltd's project financing arrangements for 
development and construction of the mine: 
 
The company's ability to borrow under the Loan Agreement is subject to a number of 
conditions precedent, including a requirement that the Company has spent at least US 
$400 million of the net proceeds of the Global Offering on development of the Lihir 
Project. . . .  Other conditions precedent that could prevent drawdowns under the 
Loan Agreement include certain material adverse changes, the occurrence of certain 
political risk events in PNG, the failure to maintain the required political risk 
insurance in favor of the Banks, anticipated funding shortfalls or completion delays, 
failure to meet minimum hedging requirements and defaults under the Loan 
Agreement or related agreements.  The Loan Agreement also contains numerous 
events of default which would entitle the Banks to prevent future drawdowns, 
declare all outstanding borrowings under the Loan Agreement to be immediately due 
and payable and foreclose on the Company's assets, almost all of which have been 
pledged or otherwise encumbered to secure such borrowings.  Finally, the Loan 
Agreement contains a number of covenants by the Company which are likely to 
restrict its future operations, including but not limited to an agreement to make 
certain mandatory prepayments and agreements not to engage in any business 
activities other than those relating to the Lihir Project and the proposed exploration 
program, incur any additional indebtedness or encumbrances or pay any dividends or 
make certain other restricted payments unless certain conditions are met, in each case 
without the required consent of the Banks (Lihir Gold Limited Prospectus, August 
22, 1995,  pp. 133-134).  
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Firms in the extractive industries are likely to offer a lease, an "area of interest," or 
an ore body as a security for the loan. While the lenders have access to reserves’ 
estimates, withholding this information from investors is likely to be inefficient.  
The reason is that once the managers have incurred the cost of obtaining the 
information to reduce the cost of project finance, withholding it is likely to expose 
managers and directors to ASX continuous disclosure regulations and insider 
trading litigation.  Further, to add credibility to their claims, managers have an 
incentive to include reserve estimates in the firm’s annual report. The inclusion of 
privately available information in the annual report in order to increase information 
credibility is proposed by Watts, 1974; Mazay, Wilkins, and Zimmer, 1993 and 
Mian and Smith, 1990).  
 
The overall effect of these project-specific financing procedures is that estimate 
uncertainty is reduced, implying that proprietary and litigation costs are likely to 
be low. It is hypothesised that: 
 
H2: Firms with project-specific financing arrangements are more likely to disclose 
their reserves in annual reports, compared to firms not involved in project-specific 
financing. 
 
 
3.6. The measurement costs of mineral reserves 
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Managers are less likely to disclose mineral reserve quantum where information 
production costs are high. Reserve measurement costs include costs to be incurred 
on conducting seismic surveys, drilling and/or removing the overburden and 
analysing the assays. In a study of estimating reserves, Carras (1986) analyses 
grade distribution, geometry, and geological and mining parameters of a variety of 
orebodies. He proposes that there is an association between the difficulty of ore 
reserve estimation and the type of orebody. The more complex the orebody, the 
more costly it is for the firm to arrive at an estimate of its ore reserve.  If the 
measurement costs of reserves are substantial, then the managers are likely to incur 
these costs infrequently, and thus abstain from disclosing reserve quantum in their 
annual reports.   
 
Oil and gas firms and gold mining firms are likely to experience low costs of 
measuring reserves compared to the non-gold mining firms, such as coal, industrial 
sands, bauxite and base metals. From a geological view, there are several 
differences between the two groups.  First, gold and petroleum reserves are likely 
to be confined in small areas and measured easily. Non-gold mining projects such 
as iron ore and coal, for example, cover vast areas and require considerable cost 
and effort to estimate. Second, because a gold or petroleum project has a shorter 
life than a non-gold operation, it is likely that the uncertainties about the former 
take less time to be resolved. There is also a need to measure the oil and gas and 
gold reserves frequently.  However, the reserves for non-gold minerals are often 
measured gradually, as development or production progresses.6 Third, the product 
                     
6 Personal conversation with Mr Hugh Thompson, Mining Consultant, Runge Mining (Australia) 
Pty Ltd and with Dr Andrew White, an ex-Director, W.H. Bryan Mining Geology Research Unit, 
The University of Queensland. 
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of base metal mines is usually a concentrate that is passed on to smelters. On the 
other hand, oil and gas and gold involve less post-extraction processing, unlike 
minerals like bauxite that needs smelting into aluminia and then aluminium. For oil 
and gas and gold, “what is pulled out of the ground is close to the final product”. 
Therefore the uncertainties about these two types of minerals are resolved earlier 
than in the case of other minerals. 
 
H3:  Firms with low measurement costs of reserves (oil and gas and 
gold mining firms) are more likely to disclose their reserves in annual 
reports, compared to firms with high measurement costs of reserves 
(non-gold mining firms). 
  
 
4. Research design 
 
As there was no obvious institutional or other reason for choosing any particular 
sample period, data from 1995 are chosen for it was the most recent year for which 
company annual reports were available at the time of conducting the study. The 
dependent variable is disclosure of quantity of reserves in the firm’s annual report. 
Reserve quantum includes all probable and proved reserves, irrespective of them 
being reported as “probable and proved” in aggregate or, as separate items. This is 
a dichotomous variable coded 0 (= no disclosure) or 1 (= disclosure). 
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Firms in the sample are classified as developers or producers. Producers have 
operating mines or wells and derive revenue from sale of product. Developers have 
neither commenced production nor earned revenue from sale of product. We 
reviewed the annual reports to assign a classification to the individual firms.7 This 
variable again is dichotomous and coded either 0 (= developers) or 1 (= 
producers).  Of course, many of these firms are also involved in exploration 
projects, and some are even involved in projects outside the extractive industries; 
hence other measures of firm activities could have resulted in different 
classifications.  However, we believe that the classification method used is 
appropriate to test the propositions developed in the paper. 
 
Firms often deal in two or more minerals simultaneously. It is common to find a 
gold mining firm involved in non-gold mining as well or a base metal mining firm 
                     
7 For example, the following extract from Allegiance Mining N.L. 1995 annual report indicates that 
the firm is a developer: 
 
“A summary of the Company’s principal projects are: 
. Development of Bielsdown Antimony Mine and associated project development for antimony 
products . . . . 
 
Over the past two years the company has made every endeavour to bring the Bielsdown Antimony 
Project into production. At this point in time the company believes that all of the elements are now 
in for the project to proceed.” (Chairman’s Report,  p.  5). 
 
Further, in the Directors’ report, principal activities are described as follows: 
 
“The principal activities of the Economic Entity during the financial period were mineral 
exploration, mine evaluation and design and planning for the construction of a mineral treatment 
facility. (p. 14).  
 
During the year, the company’s sales revenue was nil. 
 
The annual report of Triako Resources Limited contains the following description of its principal 
activities in the Directors’ report: 
 
“The principal activities of the economic entity during the financial year were: 
 
.development of the second stage of Jack’s Hut resource at Mineral Hill Mine; 
.exploring for minerals in Australia, directly and through mineral exploration joint ventures; 
.monitoring the investment in an associated company.” (p. 10). 
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engaged in oil and gas. Some firms produce several minerals. In cases like these, 
the product that has the largest dollar amount of assets is attributed to the firm. For 
example, BHP is involved in oil and gas, gold, coal and other minerals. However, 
as oil and gas is dominant in terms of the firm's assets in 1995, BHP is classified as 
an oil and gas firm. Segmental information is utilised, where this is included in the 
firm’s annual report.  
 
The use of project-specific finance is ascertainable from the annual accounts. The 
notes to the accounts include the terms of the loans, the security provided and the 
interest rates applicable. In the case of the use of gold loans as project-specific 
finance, the disclosure is available in the annual accounts and also in the directors’ 
report. Firms that have project-specific finance in place are assigned 1; others, 0.  
To ensure robustness, we also use project-specific finance as a continuous variable. 
The variable is defined as the ratio of project finance to the firm’s long term debt 
and we label it  RPFLTD8. 
 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that firms with low measurement costs of reserves are more 
likely to disclose reserve quantum compared to the high measurement costs firms. 
As discussed in the previous section, oil and gas firms and gold mining firms are 
predicted to have low measurement costs relative to non-gold mining firms. We 
label this variable MCR, and code firms as 1 if their reserves have low 
                                                         
 
8 Of course, this could have been specified in other ways.  We did consider the ratio of project 
finance to assets, but found the latter more skewed than the specification we used.  Results however 
were robust, with no material difference to using assets or long term debt as the scalar. 
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measurement costs (oil and gas or gold) or 0 if they have higher measurement costs 
(others). 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Hypothesis 
  
Direction 
 
Definition and measure 
 
DISCLOSURE 
   
Disclosure of reserves’ quantum. 
Dummy variable: 
=1 if the firm discloses reserves. 
=0 in all other cases. 
 
 
STAGE 
 
H1 
 
+ 
 
Firm’s stage of operations. 
Dummy variable: 
=1 if the firm is a  producer. 
=0  in all other cases. 
 
 
PFINAN 
 
 
 
 
 
RPFLTD 
 
H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
Use of project-specific finance. 
Dummy variable: 
=1 if the firm has  project finance. 
=0 in all other cases. 
 
 
Ratio of project finance to the firm’s  
long-term debt. 
 
 
MCR 
 
H3  
 
+ 
 
Firms with low measurement costs of reserves 
(Oil and gas and Gold mining firms). 
Dummy variable: 
=1 if the firm has low measurement costs. 
=0 in all other cases.  
 
Fig. 3. List of variables and abbreviations used 
 
 
To control for omitted variables, we include leverage, size, issue of equity capital 
and auditor quality. Prior literature suggests that these variables influence 
accounting and reporting policy choice. We also use a variable “USFIRM” to 
control for the effect of  disclosure policies of firms that are either listed in the US 
or are subsidiaries of US corporations. 
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Leverage has been shown to consistently relate to accounting and disclosure 
decisions in a large number of studies (e.g., see Watts and Zimmerman 1990). We 
use the ratio of total liabilities to total assets as a proxy for the firm’s leverage.  
Size has also been shown to relate to disclosures in annual reports by Lang and 
Lundholm (1993).  They argue that disclosure costs have a material fixed 
component; therefore larger firms are likely to provide greater disclosure. ‘Total 
assets’ is used to proxy size in this paper because firms in the extractive industries 
are often capital intensive and developers sometimes have no revenues. 
 
Managers of firms issuing additional equity are likely to make greater public 
disclosure to facilitate issue of new securities.  The results of the Gibbins, 
Richardson, and Waterhouse (1990) study as well as Lang and Lundholm (2000) 
support the view that there exists a positive relationship between security issue and 
disclosure, and that increase in disclosure does not materially precede the relevant 
equity raising. In terms of the issues discussed in the present study, they assume 
that when equity is issued the benefits of disclosure become larger relative to 
potential proprietary and litigation costs. It is therefore predicted that firms issuing 
additional equity in 1995 are more likely to disclose reserves in 1995, compared to 
the firms not involved in equity issue We consider the capital issued to external 
parties as additional equity.  However, we exclude shares issued to management 
and employees, bonus share issues, conversion of options, and notes to share 
capital.  
 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) find that auditor quality is a significantly positive 
determinant of disclosure of reserve estimates of oil and gas firms.  Auditing firms 
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are categorised into a small group of very large firms, e.g., the Big Six and the 
non-Big Six. The Big Six firms are likely to possess more depth and breadth of 
expertise and resources compared to non-Big Six firms.  Therefore, the “Big-Six” 
and “non-Big Six” dichotomy is a proxy for quality auditor.  
 
Finally, the sample contains a few firms that are subsidiaries of the US 
corporations. In addition to this, several  Australian firms are  listed on the 
American stock exchanges such as the New York and NASDAQ. Because 
disclosure policies of these firms are likely to be influenced by the US regulation, 
we include a control variable for these firms and call it USFIRM. We code 
USFIRM as 1 and Australian firms not quoted on the US stock exchanges as 0. 
 
 
5. Data analysis and results 
5.1. Sampling procedures  
 
A sample of Australian firms was selected by obtaining Jobson's Mining Yearbook 
1995/96 and identifying all 181 producers and developers listed. Firms that only 
had exploration projects were not included in the sample. Almost all firms in the 
sample in fact had exploration projects as well as the development and/or 
production projects of interest here.  After deletion of foreign firms (20), 
incomplete annual report (1) and those for which annual reports were not available 
(10), 150 firms remained.   This included 127 producers and 23 developers. Thirty-
six firms have project financing arrangements in place.  One-hundred-and-two 
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have low measurement costs of reserves (MCR), 48 have high MCR. Tables 1 to 4 
provide sample descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables  (N = 150) 
Variable No. % 
Reserves’ quantum disclosure (DISCLOSURE) 107 71% 
Producers (STAGE) 127 85% 
Firms involved in project financing  (PFINAN) 36 24% 
Firms with low measurement costs of reserves (MCR) 102 68% 
Firms raising additional equity (EQUITY) 44 29% 
Firms employing quality auditors (AUDITQ) 118 79% 
Firms that are subsidiaries of US corporations or listed 
on a US stock exchange (USFIRM) 
 
11 
 
7% 
 
Table 1 shows that 107 firms include reserve quantum in their annual reports. 
Forty-four raised additional capital in the market during the year. One-hundred-
and-eighteen firms employed Big Six auditors. Eleven are subsidiaries of US 
corporations or are listed on a US stock exchange. 
 
To complete the description of the sample, we categorise reserves into four classes 
of disclosure, i.e., “probable”, “proved”, “proved and probable combined”, and 
“proved and probable disclosed separately”. Further, we provide a breakdown of 
reserve disclosures by product and by firm type. Finally, we explore whether 
reserves are disclosed on the basis of the location of mine or well. Segmental 
disclosure of reserves is again analysed by product and firm type. We grouped 
reserve disclosers into oil and gas firms, gold mining firms and firms dealing in 
other metals. We also grouped them into producers and developers. Tables 2 and 3 
show these details of reserve quantum disclosure: 
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Table 2 
Reserve disclosure by product and by firm type 
 
Reserve 
category 
 
Oil and gas 
firms 
 
Gold 
mining 
firms 
Firms 
dealing in 
other 
minerals 
 
Producers 
 
Developers
“Probable 
reserves” 
 
1 
 
5 
 
2 
 
5 
 
3 
“Proved 
reserves” 
 
2 
 
10 
 
8 
 
16 
 
4 
“Proved 
and 
probable” 
combined 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
2 
“Proved 
and 
probable” 
separately 
disclosed 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
2 
Total 20 58 29 96 11 
N = 107; χ2= 23.4772, 6 df (0.0006) N=107;  
χ2=9.7538, 3 df   
(0.0207) 
 
Table 2 shows that oil and gas firms are more likely to disclose proved and 
probable reserves combined. On the other hand, gold mining firms disclose proved 
and probable reserves separately. The remaining disclosing firms also follow the 
same practice as the gold mining firms. Considering the disclosure by stage of 
operations, a large number of producers disclose proved and probable reserves 
both combined and separately. The differences in the disclosure by reserve 
category are significant. 
 
We attempted to examine if the firms disclosed reserves by location of mine or 
well. Table 3 shows the segmental disclosure of reserves included in the annual 
reports: 
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Table 3 
Reserve disclosure segmented by location of mine or well 
Segment 
disclosure 
by 
mine/well 
 
Oil & gas 
firms 
 
Gold 
mining 
firms 
Firms 
dealing in  
other 
minerals 
 
Producers 
 
Developers 
Reserves 
disclosed 
 
5 
 
36 
 
19 
 
59 
 
1 
Reserves 
not 
disclosed 
 
 
15 
 
 
22 
 
 
10 
 
 
37 
 
 
10 
Total 20 58 29 96 11 
N = 107; χ2= 26.8342, 2 df (0.0000) N = 107; χ2= 10.9881,  1 
df (0.0009) 
Yates’ corrected χ2 
= 8.9648, 1 df (0.0027) 
 
 
Table 3 shows that among the reserve disclosers, gold mining firms and those 
dealing in other metals are more likely to disclose reserves “by mine”.  On the 
other hand, oil and gas firms are less likely to disclose reserves “by well”. Further, 
producers are more likely to disclose their reserves on a segmental basis, 
compared to their developer counterparts. 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for leverage, size and project financing. In 
addition to using project finance as a dichotomous variable, we also use a 
continuous version of it. As stated earlier, we call this variable RPFLTD, the ratio 
of project finance to the firm’s long term debt.  
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for continuous independent variables 
 
Variable 
 
No. of 
cases =1 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. 
deviation 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
LEVER: 
(Natural 
log) 
 
 
150 
 
 
3.277 
 
 
3.4747 
 
 
0.9621 
 
 
-0.504 
 
 
2.343 
(Ratio)  42.8185 32.2883 79.4908 7.939 72.696 
SIZE: 
(Natural 
log) 
 
 
150 
 
 
11.386 
 
 
11.099 
 
 
1.9679 
 
 
1.230 
 
 
-0.494 
($million)  794.985 66.182 315.639 7.517 62.651 
RPFLTD 
(Ratio) 
 
36 
 
0.169 
 
0.000 
 
0.3488 
 
1.778 
 
1.382 
LEVER =  The firm’s leverage (Natural log of total liabilities over total assets);  
SIZE = The firm’s size (Natural log of total assets); and 
RPFLTD = Ratio of project finance to the firm’s long term debt. 
 
For the firms in the sample, the median leverage is 32.29. The mean assets as a 
proxy for firm size are $794.98 million. The total assets of the smallest firm in the 
sample are $1.37 million while those of the largest are $30.29 billion. Therefore, 
the sample chosen is likely to represent a cross section of producers and developers 
in the extractive industries. The mean ratio of project finance to the firm’s long 
term debt is 0.169:1.  
 
Table 5 shows the correlations among the independent variables.  
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Table 5 
Pearson point bi-serial correlation matrix - Independent variables 
 
Variable 
 
 
STAGE 
 
PFINAN 
 
MCR 
 
LEVER 
 
SIZE 
 
EQUITY 
 
AUDITQ 
 
USFIRM 
STAGE 
 
1.000        
PFINAN 0.066 
(0.423) 
1.000       
MCR 0.105 
(0.202) 
0.151 
(0.065) 
1.000      
LEVER 0.462 
(0.000) 
0.198 
(0.015) 
0.086 
(0.296) 
1.000     
SIZE 0.321 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.073) 
-0.187 
(0.022) 
0.177 
(0.030) 
1.000    
EQUITY -0.051 
(0.536) 
0.152 
(0.063) 
0.034 
(0.680) 
-0.060 
(0.466) 
-0.110 
(0.181) 
1.000   
AUDITQ 0.140 
(0.088) 
0.026 
(0.753) 
-0.043 
(0.599) 
-0.101 
(0.218) 
0.270 
(0.001) 
-0.058 
(0.483) 
1.000  
USFIRM 
 
-0.022 
(0.787) 
-0.038 
(0.641) 
0.029 
(0.729) 
0.101 
(0.218) 
0.322 
(0.000) 
-0.069 
(0.402) 
0.084 
(0.306) 
1.000 
STAGE = Stage of firm’s operations (Producer = 1; Developer = 0); 
PFINAN = Firm's involvement in project-specific financing (Project loan = 1;  
 No project loan = 0); 
MCR = Firms with low measurement costs of reserves - Oil and gas firms and gold mining; firms 
with high measurement costs of reserves – Non-gold mining (Low measurement costs of reserves = 
1;  High measurement costs of reserves = 0); 
LEVER =  The firm’s leverage (Natural log of total liabilities over total assets); 
SIZE = The firm’s size (Natural log of total assets);  
EQUITY = Firm’s raising additional equity funds in the market (Additional capital raised = 1 ; 
 Additional capital not raised = 0);  
AUDITQ = Auditor Quality (Big Six firm = 1; Non-Big Six = 0); and 
USFIRM = US subsidiaries or US listed firms  (US firms = 1; Australian firms = 0). 
*Two-tailed significance. Probabilities are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5 indicates that stage of operations is significantly correlated with leverage 
and with size, while size is also correlated with auditor quality, leverage, and the 
“US firms”. This result is expected as producer firms are normally large; they 
accumulate assets as their operations progress from development to production 
stage and they employ Big Six auditors. The correlation of “US firms” and size is 
also expected. Further, project finance is correlated with leverage. Measurement 
costs of reserves is negatively correlated with leverage.  
 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1989), multicollinearity is not a problem 
until bivariate correlations are in the vicinity of .70.  We conducted a diagnostic 
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test for multicollinearity of independent variables. Table 6 shows the tolerance 
level and  variance inflation factor for each independent variable. 
 
Table 6 
Collinearity statistics 
Variable STAGE PFINA
N 
MCR LEVER SIZE EQUIT
Y 
AUDIT
Q 
USFIRM 
Tolerance .663 .867 .885 .708 .665 .952 .883 .836 
Variance 
inflation 
factor 
 
 
1.507 
 
 
1.153 
 
 
1.130 
 
 
1.413 
 
 
1.503 
 
 
1.051 
 
 
1.133 
 
 
1.196 
STAGE = Stage of firm’s operations (Producer = 1; Developer = 0); 
PFINAN = Firm's involvement in project-specific financing (Project loan = 1;  
 No project loan = 0); 
MCR = Firms with low measurement costs of reserves - Oil and gas firms and gold mining; firms 
with high measurement costs of reserves – Non-gold mining (Low measurement costs of reserves = 
1;  High measurement costs of reserves = 0); 
LEVER =  The firm’s leverage (Natural log of total liabilities over total assets); 
SIZE = The firm’s size (Natural log of total assets);  
EQUITY = Firm’s raising additional equity funds in the market (Additional capital raised = 1 ; 
 Additional capital not raised = 0);  
AUDITQ = Auditor Quality (Big Six firm = 1; Non-Big Six = 0); and 
USFIRM = US subsidiaries or US listed firms  (US firms = 1; Australian firms = 0). 
 
Table 6 shows that all VIF’s are in the range of 1.051 to 1.507.  According to 
Stevens (1992), any VIF greater than 10 indicates the presence of multicollinearity 
and the deletion of variables or alternative statistics to resolve the problem needs 
to be considered.  In our study, the VIF’s are far less than the level when 
multicollinearity becomes problematic. 
 
 
5.2. Univariate tests 
 
While the hypotheses could be directly tested by multi-variate analysis, the 
presence of some collinearity between variables, due to inevitable endogeneity, 
implies that multivariate analyses are likely to be unsuitable.  Of course, the same 
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collinearity causes univariate tests to be unreliable, as the significance of one 
variable may be conditional on which other variables are included in the multiple 
regression.  Hence, we conduct both univariate and multivariate analyses to ensure 
robustness of results between both types of test. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of chi-square tests.  
 
Table 7 
Results of chi-square tests* 
Disclosure of reserves’ quantum (N = 150) 
 
Sample 
Reserves 
disclosed  
Reserves 
not 
disclosed 
 
χ2 
    
H1: Producers (n=127) 96 31 7.341 
Developers (n=23) 11 12 (0.007) 
    
H2: Project finance (n=36) 32 4 7.139 
No Project finance (n=114) 75 39 (0.008) 
    
H3: Firms with low measurement 
costs of reserves (n=102) 
78 24  
Firms with high measurement 
costs of reserve (n=48) 
29 19 4.114 
(0.043) 
    
Firms raising additional equity 
(n=44) 
31 13  
Firms not raising additional equity 
(n=106) 
76 30 0.024 
 (0.878) 
    
Firms employing Big Six auditors 
(n = 118 ) 
88 30  
Firms employing non-Big Six 
Auditors (n = 32 ) 
19 13 2.845 
(0.092) 
    
US subsidiaries or US listed firms 
(n = 11) 
 
4 
 
7 
 
Australian firms (n = 139) 
 
103 36 7.099 
(0.008) 
 
*Probability estimates are shown in parenthesis. 
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The results of chi-square tests indicate that larger proportions of producers, firms 
with project financing, and low measurement cost firms, disclose reserves quantum 
more than their counterparts. Hypotheses 1 to 3 are all supported. In addition to 
this, the control variable of auditor quality is significant at 90% confidence level.  
 
Finally, reserve disclosures of firms that are subsidiaries of US corporations or are 
listed on a stock exchange in the US are compared to Australian firms not listed in 
the US. The Australian firms are more likely to disclose reserves in their 
Australian annual reports than their “US” counterparts and the chi-square result is 
significant.  
 
We compared the differences in disclosures among the sub-samples of firms. We 
compared oil and gas firms with all mining firms, with other non-gold  (base 
metal) miners and with gold miners. We also compared gold miners with non-gold 
miners. The difference is significant only between gold mining and non-gold 
mining firms, as Table 8 below shows:  
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Table 8 
Results of chi-square tests* 
Disclosure of reserves’ quantum (N = 150) 
 
Sample 
Reserves 
disclosed  
Reserves 
not 
disclosed 
 
χ2 
    
Oil and gas firms (n = 27) 20 7 0.121 
 Mining firms ( n = 123) 87 36 (0.728) 
    
Oil and gas firms (n = 27) 20 7 1.423 
Non-gold mining firms (n = 48) 29  19 (0.232) 
    
Oil and gas firms (n = 27) 20 7 0.117 
Gold mining firms (n = 75) 58 17 (0.732) 
    
Gold mining firms (n = 75) 58 17 4.045 
Non-gold mining firms (n = 48) 29  19 (0.044) 
*Probability estimates are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Because leverage and size are continuous variables, we use a t-test. In addition to 
this, we test the continuous variable of project financing, RPFLTD.  Table 9 shows 
the results of the t-tests for the leverage, size and project financing variables.   
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Table 9 
Result of t-test for the leverage, size and project financing variables 
and disclosure of reserves quantum (DISCLOSURE) 
Leverage to disclosure of 
reserves’ quantum: 
  
df 
 
t-value 
 
p.* 
 Equal 148 0.943 (0.173) 
 Unequal 54.837 0.771 (0.222) 
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances: F = 9.636,  p. =  .0.002 
Size to disclosure of 
reserves’ quantum: 
  
df 
 
t-value 
 
p.* 
 Equal 148 -3.481 (0.000) 
 Unequal 64.427 -3.159 (0.001) 
Levene’s test for equality of variances: F = 1.658,  p. =  .200 
Project financing to 
disclosure of reserves’ 
quantum: 
  
 
df 
 
 
t-value 
 
 
p.* 
 Equal 148 -2.724 (0.003) 
 Unequal 138.644 -3.506 (0.000) 
Levene’s test for equality of variances: F = 36.662,  p. = .000 
*One-tailed test. 
LEVER =  The firm’s leverage (Natural log of total liabilities over total assets); and 
SIZE = The firm’s size (Natural log of total assets). 
RPFLTD = Ratio of project finance to the firm’s long term debt. 
 
In interpreting the results in Table 9, we rely on the equal variance t-test where 
Levene’s test does not reject equality of variances and the unequal variance test 
where equality of variance is rejected.  (Note however that results are robust to 
either specification).  The result for the t-test for leverage to disclosure of reserves 
quantum is not significant (t = 0.771, p. = .222). The results for  both size and the 
firm’s use of project financing  to quantum variable are  significant (t = -3.481, p. 
= 0.000; and t =-2.724, p. =0.003 respectively) implying that these two variables, 
project finance and size do influence the firm’s decision to disclose reserves 
quantum. However, the relationship for both the variables is in a direction opposite 
to that suggested by prior literature.  
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5.3.  Multivariate tests 
 
The following model is used for multiple regression for the sample of firms: 
 
DISCLOSURE =  β0 + β1 STAGE + β2 PFINAN + β3 MCR + β4 LEVER + β5 
SIZE + β6 EQUITY + β7 AUDITQ + β8 USFIRM + e.  . . . .        (1) 
 
Where: 
 
DISCLOSURE = Disclosure of reserve quantum in the firm’s annual report. 
 
Independent variables are: 
 
STAGE = Stage of firm’s operations; 
PFINAN = Firm's involvement in project-specific financing;          
MCR =  Firms with low costs of reserve’s measurement (Oil and gas firms and 
gold mining firms);   
LEVER =  The firm’s leverage (The natural log of total liabilities over total 
assets); 
SIZE = The firm’s size (Natural log of total assets); and 
EQUITY = Firm’s raising of additional equity funds in the market;  
AUDITQ = Firms employing Big Six auditors;  
USFIRM =  Firms either subsidiaries of US companies or listed on a US stock 
exchange; and 
e is the error term. 
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Table 10 shows the results of logistic regression. 
 
Table 10 
Results of logistic regression 
Dependent variable: disclosure of reserves’ quantum (DISCLOSURE) 
 (N = 150) 
Independent 
variable 
 
Expected 
sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
Wald statistic 
 
P* 
STAGE + 1.2770 3.4742 0.0311 
PFINAN + 1.5189 4.7109 0.0150 
MCR + 1.3645 7.7237 0.0027 
LEVER + -0.7915 7.2549 0.0035 
SIZE + 0.6162 14.6943 0.0000 
EQUITY + -0.0619 0.0158 0.4499 
AUDITQ + 0.2738 0.2733 0.3005 
USFIRM + -3.8764 14.4491 0.0000 
Constant  -5.4240 9.2051 0.0012 
Pseudo R2 = 0.271  
Percentage correctly classified = 72.1% 
*One-tailed test 
DISCLOSURE = Disclosure of reserves’ quantum  (Disclosure = 1; No disclosure = 0). 
STAGE = Stage of firm’s operations (Producer = 1; Developer = 0); 
PFINAN = Firm's involvement in project-specific financing (Project loan = 1;  
 No project loan = 0); 
MCR = Firms with low measurement costs of reserves - Oil and gas firms and gold mining; firms 
with high measurement costs of reserves – Non-gold mining (Low measurement costs of reserves = 
1;  High measurement costs of reserves = 0); 
LEVER =  The firm’s leverage (Natural log of total liabilities over total assets); 
SIZE = The firm’s size (Natural log of total assets);  
EQUITY = Firm’s raising additional equity funds in the market (Additional capital raised = 1 ; 
 Additional capital not raised = 0);  
AUDITQ = Auditor Quality (Big Six firm = 1; Non-Big Six = 0); and 
USFIRM = US subsidiaries or US listed firms  (US firms = 1; Australian firms = 0). 
 
The results for the full sample indicate that for disclosure of reserve quantum, the 
firm’s stage of operations, whether it has project financing, the cost of measuring 
reserves, and size are significant and in the hypothesised direction. Leverage and 
“US firms” are also significant but these are in the opposite direction than that 
predicted. We do not know why these results are in the direction reported.  The 
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leverage result is particularly surprising, perhaps indicating that higher debt is 
proxying for greater proprietary costs. We suggest this because under general 
conditions firms can raise private debt with less public disclosures than those 
associated with issuing equity.  In other words, we propose that there are aspects of 
reserves of higher leverage firms that cause managers to prefer to minimize 
disclosures of reserve quantum. Overall however, the results of multivariate tests 
appear to confirm those of the univariate tests. In other words, the three hypotheses 
are supported. 
 
We further analysed data by using project financing as a continuous variable, 
RPFLTD. The results of logistic regression are not reported as they are virtually 
identical.  
 
 
6. Summary 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what causes managers to voluntarily 
provide information about reserves’ quantum in the annual report.  We find that 
significant determinants of the exercise of this discretion are (1) whether the firm 
is at a development or production stage, (2) the existence of project finance, and 
(3) the cost of measuring reserves’ quantum.  These are new variables not 
considered in the limited previous research available.  
 
The findings should be of interest to policymakers when considering whether to 
regulate this currently discretionary choice, as this study implies that they should 
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be reluctant to mandate disclosures of all proved reserves.  The reason is that this 
may cause the relation between certainty and disclosure to be erased, implying in 
turn less rather than more informative and comparable financial reports. The 
findings also are relevant to analysts who want to know when to expect reserve 
disclosures to be made by firms they are valuing. To illustrate, where an analyst 
assesses that managers are “certain” of their reserve quantities but do not disclose, 
further information search by the analyst to establish reasons for the non-disclosure 
may be worthwhile.  The results are also relevant to future “share price reaction” 
and/or “information content” studies as they should consider controlling for these 
different conditions when regressing share price changes or levels against reserve 
disclosures. This study suggests that different market reactions to disclosures may 
occur depending on whether the firm is a developer or producer, whether project 
finance is in place and/or the type of product being produced. 
 
The study inevitably leaves some questions yet to be answered.  For example, there 
are a number of questions pertaining to the choice of recognising the value of 
reserves in balance sheets through revaluation or other procedures.  There is also 
little understanding of the role of reserve information in various contracts written 
by the firm including debt agreements (particularly project finance), management 
compensation schemes, and so on.  Furthermore, the explanation of the 
significance and direction of some control variables are not obvious.  These are 
likely to be proxying for other unknown factors that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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Appendix 
 
List of firms by stage of operations and reserve disclosure, Sample for year 1995, 
(N = 150) 
Firm Stage of 
operations 
Reserve 
disclosure 
Aberfoyle Ltd Producer Yes 
Acacia Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Allegiance Mining NL Developer No 
Allied Queensland Coalfields Ltd Producer No 
Amalgamated Resources NL Producer Yes 
Ampolex Ltd Producer Yes 
Anaconda Nickel NL Developer No 
Anzoil NL Developer Yes 
Ashton Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Astro Mining NL Producer No 
Auridiam Consolidated NL Producer No 
Aurora Gold Ltd Producer  Yes 
Australian Gas Light Company Producer No 
Australian Gold Resources Ltd Producer No 
Australian Hydrocarbons Ltd Producer Yes 
Australian Mining Investments Ltd Producer No 
Australian Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Ballarat Goldfields NL Developer No 
Beach Petroleum NL Producer No 
Bligh Oil and Minerals NL Producer No 
Boral Ltd Producer No 
Bougainville Copper Ltd Producer Yes 
Boulder Group NL Developer Yes 
Broken Hill Pty Company Ltd, The Producer Yes 
Burmine Ltd Producer Yes 
Caltex Australia Ltd Producer No 
Camelot Resources NL Producer Yes 
Centaur Mining & Exploration Ltd Producer No 
Centennial Coal Co Ltd Producer Yes 
Central Norseman Gold Corp. Ltd Producer Yes 
CIM Resources Ltd Developer No 
Climax Mining Ltd Producer No 
Coal & Allied Industries Ltd Producer Yes 
Comalco Ltd Producer Yes 
Command Petroleum Holdings NL Producer Yes 
Consolidated Rutile Ltd Producer No 
Coolawin Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Coolgardie Gold NL Producer Yes 
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List of firms 
Continued 
 Firm Stage of 
operations 
Reserve 
disclosure 
Coplex Resources NL Producer Yes 
Cornwall Resource Corp. NL Producer Yes 
CRA  Ltd Producer No 
Croesus Mining NL Producer Yes 
Crusader Ltd Producer Yes 
CSR Ltd Producer Yes 
Cudgen RZ Ltd Producer No 
Cultus Petroleum NL Producer Yes 
Cumnock Coal Ltd Producer No 
Delta Gold NL Producer Yes 
Denehurst Ltd Producer Yes 
Devex Ltd Producer Yes 
Discovery Petroleum NL Producer Yes 
Dome Resources NL Developer Yes 
Dominion Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Eagle Mining Corp. NL Developer Yes 
Elmina NL Producer Yes 
Emperor Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
Energy Equity Corporation Ltd Producer Yes 
Energy Resources of Australia Ltd Producer Yes 
Equatorial Mining NL Developer No 
Esso Australia Resources Ltd Producer No 
Forrestania Gold NL Producer Yes 
Gasgoyne Gold Mines NL Producer Yes 
General Gold Resources NL Producer Yes 
Geographe Resources Ltd Developer No 
Ghana Gold Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
Glengarry Resources NL Producer No 
Gold Mines of Australia Ltd Producer Yes 
Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie Ltd Producer Yes 
Golden Shamrock Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
Goldfields Ltd Producer Yes 
Great Central Mines NL Producer Yes 
Great Northern Mining Corp. NL Producer No 
Gwalia Consolidated Ltd Producer Yes 
Haoma Mining NL Producer Yes 
Hargraves Resources NL Producer No 
Herald Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Highlands Gold Ltd Producer Yes 
Imdex Ltd Developer No 
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List of firms 
Continued 
Firm Stage of 
operations 
Reserve 
disclosure 
International Mineral Resources NL Producer No 
Kidston Gold Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
Kitchener Mining NL Producer No 
Lachlan Resources NL Developer Yes 
Lynas Gold NL Producer Yes 
Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd Producer Yes 
Majestic Resources NL Developer No 
Meekatharra Minerals Ltd Developer Yes 
MIM Holdings Ltd Producer Yes 
Mount Burgess Gold Mining Co. NL Developer No 
Mount Edon Gold Mines (Aust) Ltd Producer Yes 
Mount Leyshon Gold Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
National Resources Exploration Ltd Producer Yes 
New Holland Mining NL Producer Yes 
Newcrest Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Niugini Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Normandy Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Norminco Ltd Developer Yes 
North Flinders Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
North Ltd Producer Yes 
Novus Petroleum Ltd Producer Yes 
Oil Company of Australia Ltd Producer No 
Oil Search Ltd Producer Yes 
Orion Resources NL Producer Yes 
Pan Pacific Petroleum NL Producer Yes 
Pancontinental Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Pasminco Ltd Producer Yes 
Pelsart Resources NL Developer No 
Perilya Mines NL Producer Yes 
Perseverance Corporation Ltd Producer Yes 
Petroleum Securities Australia Ltd Producer Yes 
Petroz NL Producer Yes 
Placer Pacific Ltd Producer Yes 
Plutonic Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Portman Mining Ltd Producer Yes 
Posgold Ltd Producer Yes 
Prima Resources NL Producer No 
QCT Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Queensland Metals Corporation Ltd Producer Yes 
Ramsgate Resources NL Producer Yes 
Ranger Minerals NL Developer Yes 
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List of firms 
Continued 
Firm Stage of 
operations 
Reserve 
disclosure 
Renison Goldfields Consolidated Ltd Producer Yes 
Resolute Samantha Ltd Producer Yes 
Ross Mining NL Producer Yes 
Sabminco NL Producer Yes 
Santos Ltd Producer Yes 
Savage Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Sedimentary Holdings NL Producer No 
Solomon Pacific Resources NL Developer Yes 
Sons of Gwalia Ltd Producer Yes 
Southern Pacific Petroleum NL Developer No 
St Barbara Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
Star Mining Corporation NL Developer No 
Straits Resources Ltd Producer Yes 
Taipan Resources NL Producer No 
Ticor Ltd Producer Yes 
Tindals Gold Mining NL Producer No 
Titan Resources NL Producer Yes 
Triako Resources Ltd Developer Yes 
Valdora Minerals NL Producer No 
Valiant Consolidated Ltd Producer No 
Victoria Petroleum NL Producer Yes 
Walhalla Mining Company NL Producer Yes 
Washington H Soul Pattinson & Co Ltd Producer No 
Werrie Gold Ltd Developer Yes 
Western Australian Diamond Trust Producer Yes 
Western Metals Ltd Producer Yes 
Western Mining Corp. Holdings Ltd Producer Yes 
Westgold Resources NL Producer Yes 
Westralian Sands Ltd Producer No 
Wiluna Mines Ltd Producer Yes 
Woodside Petroleum Ltd Producer Yes 
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